Download America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and by Willard C. Matthias PDF
By Willard C. Matthias
This survey of greater than fifty years of nationwide defense coverage juxtaposes declassified U.S. nationwide intelligence estimates with lately published Soviet files disclosing the perspectives of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies at the comparable occasions. Matthias exhibits that U.S. intelligence estimates have been often right yet that our political and army leaders regularly neglected them—with occasionally disastrous effects. The ebook starts off with a glance again on the function of U.S. intelligence in the course of global warfare II, from Pearl Harbor in the course of the plot opposed to Hitler and the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional quit" of Japan, and divulges how larger use of the intelligence on hand can have kept many lives and shortened the struggle. the next chapters facing the chilly warfare divulge what info and recommendation U.S. intelligence analysts handed directly to policymakers, and in addition what occasionally sour coverage debates happened in the Communist camp, touching on Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile main issue, the turmoil in jap Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars within the center East, and the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. in lots of methods, this can be a tale of overlooked possibilities the U.S. executive needed to behavior a extra liable overseas coverage which may have shunned huge losses of existence and large bills on palms buildups. whereas no longer exonerating the CIA for its personal blunders, Matthias casts new gentle at the contributions that aim intelligence research did make throughout the chilly struggle and speculates on what may have occurred if that evaluation and suggestion have been heeded.
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Additional resources for America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991
Lee, Marching Orders, 16. 24. , 17. 25. Cited by Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, 556. 26 A m e r i c a ’s S t r a t e g i c B l u n d e r s According to Liddell Hart, the Allied intelligence staff also recognized the German weakness and told General Eisenhower that the Germans could not possibly produce sufficient forces to hold the frontier line. ”26 General Patton had seen the opportunity even earlier, having proposed on August 23 that his army should move north into Germany instead of west toward Alsace.
There is no record of Churchill’s response to the President, but he made a similar statement about unconditional surrender in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944. ” Nor did it mean, Churchill went on, that the victors are entitled to behave in a barbarous manner. ”44 These declarations seem to have encouraged the conspirators to think that they could get some kind of favorable response from the Western Allies as they refined their organization and plans. Indeed, Allen Dulles during the spring months continued to report to Washington the plans, names, and character of the anti-Hitler conspirators.
The German military leaders who were left after Hitler’s purge fought on under Hitler’s relentless pressure. They did succeed in defeating Montgomery’s attempt to cross the Rhine at Nijmegen in September, and they did throw a scare into the Western commanders in their pre-Christmas offensive in the Ardennes. But after that their hearts were no longer in it. ” 64 When the Allies finally crossed the Rhine in force in March 1945, they met with only token resistance. German troops were surrendering even to the Allied prisoners of war whom they were guarding.